

Mkstemp

Don't be complacent. Several vulnerabilities possible.

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2007-04-02

Part "Original Cigital Coding Rule in XML"

Mime-type: text/xml, size: 5650 bytes

Attack Category	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Malicious Input• Privilege Exploitation• File Manipulation	
Vulnerability Category	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Temporary file creation problem• Privilege escalation problem	
Software Context	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• File Creation	
Location	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• stdlib.h	
Description	<p>Use of mkstemp() to create a temporary file should not lead to complacency, as it is still possible for vulnerabilities to be present.</p> <p>The mkstemp() function generates a unique temporary file name from the supplied template, opens a file of that name using the O_EXCL flag (guaranteeing the current process to be the only user) and returns a file descriptor.</p> <p>The POSIX specification does not say anything about file modes, so the application should make sure its umask is set appropriately before calling mkstemp.</p> <p>mkstemp() is designed to facilitate the creation of a temporary file in a way that is more secure than the use of mktemp() followed by open(). Use of mkstemp() does avoid the class of race conditions that involves a third party guessing the temporary file name and creating that file between the mktemp() and open() calls. However, use of mkstemp() does not eliminate all vulnerabilities. While use of the returned file descriptor is safe, manipulation of the temporary file by name can introduce other vulnerabilities.</p>	
APIs	Function Name	Comments
	mkstemp	
Method of Attack	A common practice of installing 'tmpwatch' utility or similar software configured to sweep	

1. <http://buildsecurityin.us-cert.gov/bsi-rules/35-BSI.html> (Barnum, Sean)

	<p>the /tmp directory on Linux and UNIX systems can compromise secure temporary file creation mechanisms in certain applications, creating a potential privilege escalation scenario.</p> <p>By taking advantage of the operation of the cleanup utility, and exploiting either an "unlink" race condition or a deletion that occurs because a process that created a temporary file is suspended for an extended period of time, an attacker can potentially substitute an imposter file for the original temporary file. This can result in a privilege escalation scenario.</p>		
Exception Criteria	The mkstemp() function is safe if only the descriptor is used and the returned filename is not used in a subsequent function call with extra privileges.		
Solutions	Solution Applicability	Solution Description	Solution Efficacy
	mkstemp() is used by privileged programs in a system with a temporary file cleanup utility.	<p>If possible, avoid using the name of the temporary file to perform any sensitive file operations.</p> <p>Using a file cleanup utility with more secure logic may somewhat reduce vulnerability. But it is not clear that there is a design that eliminates all risk.</p> <p>Privileged applications should use private temporary directories for sensitive files, if possible. (Doing this in a mandatory fashion may, however, create portability issues.)</p>	Efficacy depends on particular solution.
Signature Details	int mkstemp(char *template);		

Examples of Incorrect Code	<pre>int fd = mkstemp("FooTemplate"); // write to fd const char *fileName = useFstatToGetFileNameFromDescriptor(fd); [...] // attacker could potentially substitute a different file to be opened in the next line int fd2 = open(fileName, O_EXCL); // rely on data read from fd2</pre>	
Examples of Corrected Code	<pre>// set umask appropriately int fd = mkstemp("FooTemplate"); // write to fd // rely on data read from fd</pre>	
Source References	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • http://www.bindview.com/Services/Razor/Papers/2002/mkstemp.cfm • ITS4 Source Code Vulnerability Scanning Tool³ 	
Recommended Resources	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Man page for functions to create a temporary file⁴ • Man page for mkstemp⁵ 	
Discriminant Set	Operating System	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • UNIX (All)
	Languages	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • C • C++

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